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Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #427

This week’s newsletter summarizes the disclosure of two denial-of-service vulnerabilities in older versions of Eclair and describes a proposed scheme for runnin

This week’s newsletter summarizes the disclosure of two denial-of-service
vulnerabilities in older versions of Eclair and describes a proposed scheme for
running complex multi-round contracts inside Lightning channels. Also included
are our regular sections announcing new releases and release candidates and
describing notable changes to popular Bitcoin infrastructure software.

News

  • ● Disclosure of two DoS vulnerabilities fixed in Eclair v0.14.1: Erick
    Cestari posted to Delving Bitcoin the responsible
    disclosure
    of two denial-of-service (DoS)
    vulnerabilities in the channel opening process of Eclair v0.14.0 and earlier.
    Both were fixed in Eclair #3324 and released in v0.14.1 in July, and users running an older version should upgrade.

    The first, found by Matt Morehouse with his smite fuzzer, is a
    race condition in a duplicate temporary_channel_id check. Eclair checked
    whether the ID was already in use before accepting an open_channel message,
    but did not record the new channel until a later step, so an attacker sending
    several identical open_channel messages in quick succession could get two
    past the check. Eclair then created two channel states for one ID, and the
    second replaced the first, leaving an unreachable channel state that held
    about 25 kB of memory until the peer disconnected. Repeating the attack leaked
    about 1 MB per second until the node ran out of memory or spent all of its CPU
    on garbage collection.

    The second, found by Cestari, bypasses Eclair’s limit on the number of pending
    channels whose funding transaction has not confirmed. The duplicate check only
    looked at temporary IDs, so an attacker could start opening a channel, then
    reuse that channel’s final channel_id as the temporary_channel_id of the
    next open_channel. The limiter counted the reused ID twice and dropped both
    entries once the new channel received its final ID, so its count never rose
    above two while the number of pending channels grew without bound. Each
    pending channel stores a copy of the peer’s init features, and setting a
    single unknown odd feature bit at a very high position inflated that copy to
    about 65 kB. In Cestari’s test, one connection with no onchain cost exhausted
    a node’s 4 GB of memory in about 48 minutes. Because pending channels are
    written to the database, the node crashed again on every restart until its
    memory limit was raised or the rows were deleted by hand.

    Replying to a question, Morehouse noted that mobile wallets that use an Eclair
    node as their LSP, such as Phoenix, are unaffected because ACINQ patched its
    nodes months ago.

  • ● Offchain contracts in Lightning channels: Adam Gibson posted
    to the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list about a proposal for protocol,
    called LN-GAP, to run complex, multi-round, two-party contracts inside a
    Lightning channel while settling disputes onchain in a constant number of
    transactions. In order to showcase the proposal, Gibson implemented a game
    of chess, which he deems a good example of a game that is difficult to run
    onchain, in which the winner takes the whole pot. Both a repository
    and a paper for the proposal are available.

    Two players, Alice and Bob, agree on a certain set of rules. Each player makes
    their own moves. In case of a dispute, Alice can enforce the rules onchain.
    However, Gibson notes that Lightning can enforce rules about a published state,
    but it cannot do so in case a counterparty stalls or stops responding.
    To address this issue, Gibson introduces a venue, a committee of members whose
    role is to attest whether a signed message (a move in a chess game and its
    signature) was published before a certain deadline or not. The venue only needs
    to attest the timeliness of the publication, not the content of the message.
    In case of a dispute, Alice posts a transaction claiming that no event was
    published by Bob; in turn, Bob can post a second transaction containing a
    rebuttal (his move and the venue’s attestation); finally, Alice can post a
    disproof, stating that Bob’s rebuttal doesn’t stand due to the event not being
    compliant with the rules.

    In Gibson’s proposal, the venue never holds users’ funds. Moreover, it avoids
    relying on FROST-style threshold signature in order to make fraud attributable
    only to malicious members. To do so, attestation is done through per-member
    “one-bit signatures” checked using OP_CHECKSIGADD. Members are incentivized
    by fees paid atomically over channels using adaptors.
    However, the construction relies on an honest-majority assumption. If more than
    half of the members of the venue collude with one of the parties involved, funds
    can be stolen.

    Other than games, possible applications include proof-of-storage
    contracts, where a provider forfeits a bond for failing to respond to a
    challenge, and offchain dispute resolution similar to what
    BitVMX-style zero-knowledge verifiers do onchain.

Releases and release candidates

New releases and release candidates for popular Bitcoin infrastructure
projects. Please consider upgrading to new releases or helping to test
release candidates.

Notable code and documentation changes

Notable recent changes in Bitcoin Core, Core
Lightning
, Eclair, LDK,
LND, libsecp256k1, Hardware Wallet
Interface (HWI)
, Rust Bitcoin, BTCPay
Server
, BDK, Bitcoin Improvement
Proposals (BIPs)
, Lightning BOLTs,
Lightning BLIPs, Bitcoin Inquisition, and BINANAs.

  • ● Eclair #3396, #3397, and #3400 fix
    several ways a malicious channel peer could prevent Eclair from enforcing
    HTLCs onchain during splicing (see
    Newsletter #423). Previously, a peer could make
    Eclair sign a splice transaction that could not be published promptly by
    choosing a distant absolute locktime, adding inputs with relative
    timelocks
    , providing nonstandard witnesses, exceeding the
    standard transaction weight limit, or setting the signed transaction’s
    feerate too low. The first PR adds checks for these cases. The second makes
    Eclair retry commitment and penalty transactions that
    were rejected by a conflicting unconfirmed transaction, as the peer may later
    replace that transaction through RBF by double-spending one of
    its other inputs. The retry fix also applies when the channel’s funding
    transaction is unconfirmed, including zero-conf channels. The third fixes another recovery gap: if an RBF replacement of a
    splice confirms after Eclair force-closes using a commitment for a sibling
    attempt, Eclair now recognizes that the funding transaction has changed and
    broadcasts a commitment transaction that spends the confirmed splice output.
    Previously, funds could remain locked and HTLCs unenforced.

  • ● Eclair #3399 and #3394 fix two ways on-the-fly
    funding
    could leave Eclair paying a downstream peer
    without collecting the corresponding incoming HTLC (see
    Newsletter #419). Previously, after Eclair stopped
    tracking an expired payment, a new payment could reuse its payment hash. If
    the downstream peer then claimed the original outgoing HTLC onchain,
    revealing the preimage, Eclair could mistakenly fulfill the newer payment’s
    incoming HTLCs instead of the original ones, allowing the original incoming
    HTLCs to time out without paying Eclair. The first PR now checks if a
    settlement belongs to the currently tracked payment and, if not, it uses the
    incoming HTLC details retained with the settlement to fulfill the correct
    HTLCs. The second PR ensures that funded payments are only forwarded over the
    channel where liquidity was purchased. Previously, Eclair could forward over
    another channel with the same peer, but would only check the funded channel
    before failing upstream at expiry, even though the outgoing HTLC on the other
    channel remained claimable.

  • ● Eclair #3395 fixes a bug where a spender could construct a malformed
    payment onion packet with a valid HMAC that left an incoming HTLC unresolved. The spender could encode a per-hop payload length larger
    than the packet’s actual capacity while still providing a valid HMAC.
    Previously, Eclair did not validate the length before extracting the next
    HMAC, causing an uncaught exception. The relayer would then resume without
    failing the HTLC, and the malformed packet could also prevent HTLC cleanup
    from initializing after a restart. Now, Eclair checks that the per-hop
    payload, including its HMAC, fits within the packet. If it does not, Eclair
    returns InvalidOnionVersion, allowing normal failure handling.

  • ● Eclair #3401 fixes a bug that could cause a forwarding node to lose funds
    after a disconnection. Eclair stores instructions to fulfill or fail
    HTLCs until the corresponding channel updates are signed,
    allowing them to be retried after reconnection. Previously, if a duplicate or
    conflicting instruction was rejected because a fulfillment had already been
    proposed but not signed, Eclair scheduled the deletion of the original stored
    instruction. If the channel disconnected before signing, the unsigned update
    was discarded, leaving no instruction to replay the fulfillment. The incoming
    HTLC could then time out even though the outgoing HTLC had already been
    fulfilled. Eclair now retains the original instruction until the settlement
    is signed.

  • ● LDK #5080 fixes a bug where restarting during cooperative channel close
    could prevent pending HTLCs from being failed back to their
    upstream peer. Previously, when LDK restarted, it excluded channels
    undergoing cooperative close from the lookup used to process HTLCs, even
    though those channels could still have unresolved payments. Consequently,
    when a downstream peer failed an HTLC, LDK could mistakenly treat the
    upstream channel as nonexistent and discard the failure. LDK could also drop
    incoming HTLCs awaiting onion decoding. This could leave HTLCs unresolved
    until the upstream peer force-closed the channel at expiry. LDK now includes
    channels undergoing shutdown when restoring the information needed to resolve
    existing HTLCs.

  • ● LDK #5087 fixes a potential privacy leak in onion messages sent over blinded paths that use dummy hops
    (see Newsletter #370). Dummy hops are additional
    encrypted layers that the recipient processes to obscure its position in the
    path. Previously, forwarding hops rejected intermediate onion layers
    containing message-content TLV records, but dummy hops accepted them. A
    malicious sender could insert these records at different, nonfinal layers and
    observe whether the final message produced a response, potentially revealing
    where the actual forwarding ended and the dummy hops began. LDK now rejects
    message-content records at dummy hops as well.

  • ● LND #11068 fixes a missing check for auxiliary HTLC
    signatures on experimental taproot overlay channels used for Taproot
    Assets
    (see Newsletter #324). In these channels, a Taproot Assets signer (tapd) provides an
    additional signature entry for each non-dust
    HTLC alongside the usual Bitcoin signatures. Previously, if a peer sent a
    commitment containing the required Bitcoin signatures but omitted some or all
    of the auxiliary HTLC signature entries, the receiving LND node would
    incorrectly accept it. If the channel is later force-closed, the missing
    signatures could prevent the affected asset HTLCs from being resolved
    onchain. LND now verifies that the number of received auxiliary signature
    entries matches the number of non-dust HTLCs. If they differ, LND rejects the
    commitment and force-closes the channel.

  • ● Rust Bitcoin #6956 introduces a ScriptCode type for the script data
    used in legacy and segwit v0 signature hashing, which may differ from the
    full script being spent. According to BIP143, when a P2WSH script
    contains OP_CODESEPARATOR, signature hashing
    excludes everything up to and including the last separator executed before
    the signature check, while retaining any subsequent separators. Previously,
    p2wsh_signature_hash accepted a witness script, which could lead callers to
    hash the complete script and produce an invalid signature. The API now
    accepts ScriptCode, but callers must still identify the last executed
    separator and shorten the script themselves. The PR also adds
    P2wpkhScriptCode, a fixed-size, allocation-free representation of the
    standard script used to sign P2WPKH inputs.

  • ● BDK #2319 fixes a bug where an Electrum-backed wallet could lose track of
    a transaction’s confirmation after a reorg if the same transaction was mined
    again at the same height. BDK could retain the displaced block’s header in
    its cache and fail to recognize the transaction’s confirmation in the
    replacement block, incorrectly showing it as unconfirmed. The fix refreshes
    the header cache with newly fetched block headers during synchronization,
    including after a one-block reorg.


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来源:Bitcoin Optech。本文按 MIT 许可转载;保留原文文字与链接,调整页面排版,未转载原图。标题如含主题导读,由新云社补充。 Original text and links retained; formatting adapted and images omitted. Any topic guide added to the title is editorial.

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