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Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #428

This week’s newsletter describes a design for a single-issuer layer 2 whose users can redeem their bitcoin onchain without the issuer’s cooperation and summariz

This week’s newsletter describes a design for a single-issuer layer 2 whose
users can redeem their bitcoin onchain without the issuer’s cooperation and
summarizes a proposal for including hash preimages in output script
descriptors. Also included are our regular sections describing recent changes
to services and client software, announcing new releases and release
candidates, and describing notable changes to popular Bitcoin infrastructure
software.

News

  • ● Trust-minimized exits from a single-issuer layer 2: Adam Gibson
    posted to the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list a paper
    and proof-of-concept code for Lichen, a design in which a
    single issuer, which Gibson calls a hub, mints tokens redeemable one-to-one
    for bitcoin on a layer 2 ledger run by a server called the sequencer. Each
    user holds a 2-of-2 contract with the hub that lets them redeem their tokens
    even if the hub refuses or is offline, so users trust the sequencer to run the
    ledger honestly but not the hub to return their bitcoin. The design builds on
    LN-GAP (see Newsletter #427) but replaces its honest-majority
    attestation committee with a dispute settled entirely onchain.

    Each user locks bitcoin in their own 2-of-2 output with the hub and receives
    the same amount of tokens on the layer 2 ledger, where users pay each other
    without touching the chain. To exit, a user hands tokens back to the hub and
    collects bitcoin from their own output. Because that output is the only one a
    user can draw on, the hub also locks some of its own bitcoin in each output up
    to a negotiated cap, like LN inbound liquidity, so that the user can redeem
    tokens received from others. Tokens received beyond the cap are redeemable
    only at the hub’s discretion.

    In the cooperative case, the hub simply signs a settlement of the output
    paying the user. If it refuses or does not respond, the user generates a
    Groth16 proof that the sequencer signed a state recording the returned tokens.
    Since Script cannot verify such a proof, the user instead claims onchain that
    a fixed verifier program accepts it, and if the hub disputes that, presigned
    BitVMX transactions narrow the disagreement to a single execution
    step that Script can check. Each side locks a reserve that it forfeits by
    losing a dispute, deterring false claims and refusals. Gibson acknowledges
    that a sequencer that omits a user’s return, or signs a state it never validly
    reached, can still cost the user or the hub funds, and lists validity proofs
    and a committee of sequencers as future work.

  • ● Descriptor syntax for hash preimages: João Dias posted to
    Delving Bitcoin a proposal for extending BIP379 to add a private form
    for hash fragments to miniscript. As of today, there is
    no way to directly give a preimage to Bitcoin Core’s wallet to spend funds
    that need one to satisfy a spending condition. It is only possible to
    provide it through external tools in one of the PSBT hash
    fields (e.g. PSBT_IN_SHA256). The author noted that this proposal only
    covers the preimages already known when a descriptor is created, not
    those learned at spend time, such as in a HTLC.

    Dias explained that the preimage should be treated more like a key
    than a signature, highlighting an inconsistency in the
    descriptor model. His idea aims to let a wallet import
    a secret from a descriptor and build and sign a transaction directly.
    To do so, the author proposed a specific syntax for the descriptor (e.g.
    sha256(preimage(HEX))) and a set of boundaries, such as the need for
    a specific marker instead of raw hex, a fixed size of 32 bytes for all the
    hash fragments, and the requirement to handle the preimage like any other secret,
    with backups, encryption, and never shown in the public descriptor string.

    Before proceeding to formalize the proposal, Dias highlighted some open
    points that need to be addressed, such as what the marker syntax should be , whether
    to amend BIP379 or draft a new BIP, if it is necessary to add an RPC call for
    Bitcoin Core to manage preimages, whether hardware signing devices should handle
    preimage secrets or this should remain software-wallet-only, and if there is any
    interest in deterministically deriving preimages from key material.

Changes to services and client software

In this monthly feature, we highlight interesting updates to Bitcoin
wallets and services.

  • ● Ibis Wallet v5.0-beta released: Ibis Wallet v5.0-beta (see
    Newsletter #406) adds Ark support built on Bark,
    unilateral exits from the Spark statechain, and receiving
    to silent payment addresses.

  • ● Landfall wallet for Lightning mining payouts: Landfall is a
    proof-of-concept wallet, showing UX achievable today, that derives from a single seed the payout address,
    BOLT12 offer, and BIP322
    signature that the OCEAN mining pool requires to pay rewards over LN, using a
    Lexe-hosted node (see Newsletter #419). It is not intended for
    production use.

  • ● rbitcoin 0.8.0 released: rbitcoin 0.8.0 is a Bitcoin
    full node written in Rust and built on rust-bitcoin, described as entirely AI-written, for wallet and Lightning
    backends that replaces the UTXO set with a relational archive, serves Electrum
    and Esplora-style APIs, and uses BIP324 exclusively.

Releases and release candidates

New releases and release candidates for popular Bitcoin infrastructure
projects. Please consider upgrading to new releases or helping to test
release candidates.

  • ● Eclair 0.14.4 and 0.14.5 are security releases for this
    LN node implementation. Version 0.14.4 fixes several issues related to
    splicing, HTLC settlement, on-the-fly
    funding
    , and onion parsing, as described in Newsletter
    #427
    . It also rejects API requests with an Origin
    header to prevent cross-site request forgery using cached HTTP Basic
    authentication credentials (see Newsletter #423).
    Browser-based integrations must now use their own backend to call Eclair.
    Version 0.14.5 fixes the trampoline routing and taproot splicing
    vulnerabilities described below, and closes an integer-overflow bypass of the
    onion payload length validation covered in Newsletter #427. The project strongly recommends upgrading.

  • ● BDK chain 0.23.4 is a maintenance release of BDK’s libraries for building
    Bitcoin wallets. It fixes issues with transaction tracking and full scans
    that stop before checking all previously revealed addresses. Accompanying
    updates fix Bitcoin Core RPC synchronization after reorgs and include
    previously covered Electrum fixes for txid verification,
    confirmation detection for transactions with an OP_RETURN first
    output
    , and confirmation tracking after
    reorgs
    .

  • ● LND v0.21.5-beta.rc1 and v0.20.6-beta.rc1 are
    release candidates for maintenance versions of this popular LN node
    implementation. Both include the fee-update handling and channel-message
    limits described in Newsletter #418, along with fixes for
    commitment feerates, excessive memory allocation when parsing TLV records,
    and SQL database deadlocks. Version 0.21.5 also includes the auxiliary
    HTLC signature validation fix for Taproot Assets channels described in Newsletter #427, and fixes wallet synchronization during blockchain reorganizations.

Notable code and documentation changes

Notable recent changes in Bitcoin Core, Core
Lightning
, Eclair, LDK,
LND, libsecp256k1, Hardware Wallet
Interface (HWI)
, Rust Bitcoin, BTCPay
Server
, BDK, Bitcoin Improvement
Proposals (BIPs)
, Lightning BOLTs,
Lightning BLIPs, Bitcoin Inquisition, and BINANAs.

  • ● Eclair #3409 fixes a vulnerability that could allow a malicious payer to
    steal funds from a node forwarding trampoline payments. Eclair now limits the total CLTV expiry delta of a downstream route to ensure that the outgoing HTLC expires before
    the incoming HTLC (see Newsletter #423 for a related
    fix). Previously, when pathfinding failed, Eclair would retry with relaxed
    limits on route length and expiry, allowing a payer to provide routing hints
    or blinded paths with excessive expiry deltas. The payer
    could then reclaim the incoming HTLC onchain after it expired, while the
    receiver could still claim the outgoing HTLC. Eclair now only relaxes the
    route-length limit, preserving the required expiry ordering.

  • ● Eclair #3411 fixes a vulnerability that could allow a malicious channel
    peer to steal funds by making Eclair sign an invalid splice
    transaction (see Newsletter #427 for related fixes).
    When splicing simple taproot channels, a
    peer can only provide the amount and script of an input’s previous output
    instead of the full transaction. Previously, Eclair trusted these values
    without verifying them. A peer could lie about either field, causing Eclair
    to sign a splice transaction that could never confirm because taproot
    signatures commit to the actual amounts and scripts of the spent inputs.
    Nevertheless, Eclair would treat the invalid splice as its latest channel
    funding state. The peer could then publish a previously signed commitment
    spending the previous funding output and claim an outgoing HTLC
    using its payment preimage after Eclair’s corresponding incoming HTLC had
    timed out and been refunded, leaving Eclair unable to collect the forwarded
    payment. Eclair now verifies the claimed outputs against its Bitcoin backend
    before signing.

  • ● LDK #5126 fixes a bug where BOLT12 payments using one-hop
    blinded paths could be rejected because their HTLC expiry
    was too short. Previously, LDK ignored the path’s cltv_expiry_delta because
    the introduction node was also the receiver. This overlooked the fact that it
    includes the receiver’s required final CLTV delta.
    Consequently, payments only met the receiver’s minimum requirement when LDK’s
    random CLTV offset was large enough. This caused intermittent payment
    failures when testing against Core Lightning. LDK now includes the advertised
    delta when constructing the route and checking its maximum permitted total
    CLTV delta.

  • ● LND #10919 adds an experimental local reputation system to mitigate
    channel jamming attacks, based on the
    proposed HTLC accountability scheme (see Newsletters #377
    and #387), which replaces the earlier HTLC
    endorsement
    approach. The system scores outgoing
    channels based on past forwarding activity and the node’s advertised fees,
    penalizing accountable HTLCs that take too long to resolve. The
    system is enabled by default and logs whether HTLCs would qualify for
    protected resources, without affecting forwarding decisions. Reputation
    resets on restart.

  • ● BTCPay Server #7679 fixes a bug that could lead to duplicate Lightning
    payouts. Previously, if a payout was initiated and a subsequent payment
    lookup returned no results, BTCPay Server would cancel the payout and discard
    its saved payment hash. This occurred even if the payment had succeeded.
    Consequently, an operator could issue another payout for a payment that had
    already succeeded. BTCPay Server now retains payouts in progress and their
    payment hashes for subsequent checks.

  • ● BTCPay Server #7684 fixes a privilege escalation in its Greenfield API
    key authorization. Previously, an API key restricted to a particular store
    could exercise server-wide or account-wide permissions despite its limited
    scope. Additionally, a key authorized to create API keys for other users
    could also grant permissions broader than its own. BTCPay Server now enforces
    permission scopes when authorizing requests and prevents API keys from
    granting permissions they do not possess. Existing unrestricted administrator
    keys retain their intended capabilities.

  • ● BDK #2325 and #2360 fix two bugs that could cause the wallet
    to report successful synchronization without retrieving the requested
    transaction data. The first affects Electrum synchronization of individual
    outpoints. Previously, BDK ignored all errors encountered when fetching their
    transactions, including connection failures and timeouts. This could cause a
    spent output to remain classified as unspent. BDK now ignores Electrum
    protocol errors on this path while propagating other failures. The second PR
    fixes sync and full_scan in the Electrum and Esplora clients. Previously,
    setting Electrum’s batch_size or Esplora’s parallel_requests to zero
    could silently skip requested scans or transaction fetches while reporting
    success. Both clients now treat zero as one for these parameters.

  • ● BOLTs #1357 updates BOLT11 to require invoice readers to reject
    invoices unless they contain exactly one payment hash (p) and one payment
    secret (s) field. Previously, the specification recommended that payers use
    the first p field, while some invoice parsers used the last. This
    discrepancy was exploited against LNP2PBot, whose invoice
    parser and Lightning node selected different payment hashes. Consequently,
    the bot treated completed payouts as unpaid, allowing attackers to obtain
    duplicate payouts (see Newsletter #425).

  • ● BOLTs #1352 corrects several errors in the simple taproot
    channels
    specification and test vectors (see
    Newsletter #404). Errors in taproot output-key derivation
    and control-block construction could produce invalid spends if implemented as
    previously specified. The PR also clarifies that HTLC
    signatures exchanged in commitment_signed use
    SIGHASH_SINGLE|SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY: the receiving peer appends 0x83 to
    the 64-byte signature when constructing the witness. When combining
    second-level transactions for fee bumping, each HTLC input and its
    corresponding output must occupy matching indices in the combined
    transaction. Additional corrections cover anchor spending paths, MuSig2 nonce encoding and derivation, and
    local and remote commitment test vectors. These changes align the
    specification with existing LND and Eclair implementations without changing
    protocol behavior.


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来源:Bitcoin Optech。本文按 MIT 许可转载;保留原文文字与链接,调整页面排版,未转载原图。标题如含主题导读,由新云社补充。 Original text and links retained; formatting adapted and images omitted. Any topic guide added to the title is editorial.

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