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Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #431

This week’s newsletter links to draft BIPs for exfiltration-resistant signing, summarizes the disclosure of three vulnerabilities affecting older versions of Bi

This week’s newsletter links to draft BIPs for exfiltration-resistant signing,
summarizes the disclosure of three vulnerabilities affecting older versions of
Bitcoin Core, announces a plan for mining the testnet5 genesis block, and
describes an investigation into degraded compact block reconstruction. Also
included are our regular sections announcing new releases and release
candidates and describing notable changes to popular Bitcoin infrastructure
software.

News

  • ● Draft BIPs for anti-exfil signing: Connor Avila posted
    to the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list about a proposal to standardize
    exfiltration-resistant signing
    for hardware devices. Since the nonce is chosen by the signing device,
    a compromised device may be able to leak its seed. The proposal introduces
    the possibility for the host to contribute to the nonce generation, a
    technique already used by several manufacturers but never standardized
    (see Newsletter #136). This is not the first time
    this topic has been discussed: Stepan Snigirev made a first proposal in 2020
    to standardize exfiltration-resistant signing (see
    Newsletter #87), Pieter Wuille provided an overview of
    the different techniques available (see Newsletter #88),
    Moonsettler proposed an anti-exfiltration protocol in 2024 (see
    Newsletter #317), and the recently-merged BIP461
    provides a way to identify possible attempts to leak key material by a
    signing device (see Newsletter #424).

    Avila’s proposal comes with two draft BIPs. The first one
    covers anti-exfil signing for schnorr and
    ECDSA signatures, defining a two-round protocol in which a host provides
    its own randomness for nonce generation and checks that the signing device
    has actually used it. The second draft adds three dedicated
    per-input fields to PSBTs in order to run the anti-exfil protocol.
    The proposal also comes with test vectors, a reference implementation in Python, and
    a C module for libsecp256k1.

    Avila noted that Sjors Provoost had already published an
    experimental draft covering single-signer taproot key-path signing.
    According to the author, Provoost plans to align his implementations with Avila’s
    specification. Finally, Avila requested feedback and reviews from other developers, since
    his proposal had not received any audit on the cryptography.

  • ● Disclosure of three vulnerabilities in Bitcoin Core: Antoine Poinsot
    posted to the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list three Bitcoin Core
    security advisories, one high-severity and two medium-severity, for
    vulnerabilities that were fixed in Bitcoin Core 29.2 and 30.0. According to
    the disclosure policy (see Newsletter #306), medium and high severity vulnerabilities are disclosed two
    weeks after the last affected release reaches end of life, which the 29.x
    series did on October 27. The three disclosed vulnerabilities are the
    following:

    Fixes for the first two vulnerabilities were also included in Bitcoin Core
    28.3. All of the affected release series have now reached end of life, so
    anyone still running one should upgrade to a maintained release.

  • ● Testnet5 genesis block to be mined: Anthony Towns posted
    to the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list a plan to mine the genesis block of
    testnet5, the proposed replacement for testnet4 specified
    in BIP95 (see Newsletters #409 and #412). Mining is set to begin once mainnet reaches its next difficulty
    adjustment at block 975,744, expected on November 13. The genesis block
    will commit to a mainnet block hash at or after that height, so nobody can
    mine testnet5 blocks in advance. Because testnet5’s minimum difficulty is
    about a million times higher than testnet4’s (to prevent large numbers of
    blocks from being mined quickly after launch, before difficulty adjusts),
    mining the first blocks requires ASICs, and Towns described a public pool that anyone can point hashrate at so that developers
    have no head start.

    After the genesis block is mined, its values will replace the placeholders in
    BIP95. Towns noted that node software will still need testnet5 parameters and
    BIP54 consensus cleanup logic, plus DNS seeds,
    faucets, and explorers, before the network is ready for general use.

  • ● Continued discussion of compact block reconstruction stats: 0xB10C
    posted to his Delving Bitcoin thread (see Newsletter
    #382
    ) an explanation for why compact block relay performed poorly from mid-July to mid-October. In September, he
    reported that his nodes could reconstruct only 1% to 5% of
    blocks without requesting transactions and were requesting about 100 kB per
    block. Gregory Sanders found that nearly all of
    the transactions his node was missing belonged to chains of rune mints, which
    reached mining pools minutes before other nodes.

    Investigations on the Bitcoin Network Operations Collective forum (one, two) traced the chains to someone minting tokens
    as cheaply as possible. Each transaction was roughly 100 vbytes, had a
    pay-to-anchor (P2A) input and P2A and OP_RETURN
    outputs, and paid about 10 sat in fees. Peers sent the chains directly to
    nodes without announcing them, and other peers sent transactions that each
    spent a P2A output from the middle of a chain, paying its whole value as
    fees. Each of those replaced the rest of its chain in any
    mempool that accepted it, and whether a node kept the chain or the
    replacement depended partly on which arrived first. Mempools diverged from
    what pools mined, so nodes had to request the missing transactions.

Releases and release candidates

New releases and release candidates for popular Bitcoin infrastructure
projects. Please consider upgrading to new releases or helping to test
release candidates.

  • ● LDK v0.3-rc4 is the fourth release candidate for the next major version
    of this library for building LN-enabled wallets and applications, following
    the candidate described in Newsletter #426. Developers
    should review the API and backwards-compatibility changes
    before testing, including the invalidation of previously issued BOLT11
    invoices containing payment metadata.

  • ● LDK v0.2.8 and v0.1.14 are security releases for the 0.2
    and 0.1 branches of this library, respectively. Both fix vulnerabilities that
    could lead to a loss of funds or a DoS attack, as well as the
    cooperative-close issues described below and a route-hint handling issue.
    Version 0.2.8 also fixes a fee overpayment vulnerability affecting payments
    of static BOLT12 invoices and DoS vulnerabilities affecting LSPS2 services.

  • ● LND v0.21.8-beta and v0.20.8-beta are maintenance
    releases of this LN node implementation. Both include the AMP recovery,
    channel funding, restored-channel force-close, and confirmation-hint fixes
    described below. They also address recovery of forwarded HTLCs across link
    reconnections and include sweeper and channel state fixes.

Notable code and documentation changes

Notable recent changes in Bitcoin Core, Core
Lightning
, Eclair, LDK,
LND, libsecp256k1, Hardware Wallet
Interface (HWI)
, Rust Bitcoin, BTCPay
Server
, BDK, Bitcoin Improvement
Proposals (BIPs)
, Lightning BOLTs,
Lightning BLIPs, Bitcoin Inquisition, and BINANAs.

  • ● Bitcoin Core #36142 fixes command injection through the Tor control endpoint. An attacker controlling or
    impersonating that endpoint could return a malicious onion service private
    key. Bitcoin Core would then save and reuse the key, allowing the attacker to
    inject additional Tor control commands or arguments. Bitcoin Core now
    validates keys before saving or reusing them and checks returned onion
    service IDs. If an existing cached key fails validation, the onion service
    will be unavailable. Deleting the cached key and restarting will generate a
    new onion address.

  • ● BIPs #2251 adds BIP394, a draft specification for the rawtr()
    output script descriptor previously discussed in Newsletter #419. Unlike tr(), which derives a taproot output key
    from an internal key and an optional script tree, rawtr() takes the output
    key directly without applying a tweak. This allows a wallet to describe an
    output without knowing its internal structure. However, a rawtr()
    descriptor does not prove that other spending paths are
    absent. Therefore, software importing one from an untrusted source should
    warn users of the possibility of hidden scriptpaths. Bitcoin Core has
    supported this descriptor since version 24.0 (see Newsletter #213).

  • ● BIPs #2347 updates BIP95, the draft specification for
    testnet5 (see Newsletter #412), to make its
    proposed genesis block easier to mine using pool infrastructure (see the news item above).
    The commitment to a recent mainnet block hash shifts from a public-key field
    in the coinbase output to readable text in the coinbase input script. The
    output uses OP_RETURN instead, which explicitly marks it as unspendable and
    provides eight bytes of extra nonce space. The draft also allows miners to
    vary the block version, expanding the available mining search space. The
    example genesis block remains a placeholder.

  • ● BIPs #2342 clarifies BIP34’s encoding of the block height at the
    start of the coinbase input script for chains that enforce the rule
    immediately after genesis, such as signet and
    testnet4. Heights 1 to 16 must use the single-byte opcodes
    OP_1 through OP_16, without a length prefix. The earlier wording could be
    interpreted as requiring a length-prefixed number. This clarification aligns
    with the existing behavior of Bitcoin Core. It also notes that the coinbase
    input script must still contain at least two bytes, so the height opcode
    alone is insufficient (see Newsletter #406).

  • ● Core Lightning #9610 fixes a peer-triggered crash caused by an oversized
    HTLC amount. This crash could be triggered by a channel peer
    proposing an HTLC with a bogus amount of at least about 92 million BTC,
    setting the amount field’s highest bit. The value could then be interpreted
    as negative during a signed balance check, bypassing the check for sufficient
    funds. Subsequent commitment transaction construction triggered an assertion
    and terminated channeld, the affected channel’s subprocess. Now, CLN
    rejects amounts above the BOLT1 ceiling of 21 million BTC, expressed in
    millisatoshis, before performing the balance arithmetic.

  • ● LDK #5507 and #5532 fix cooperative-close bugs that could
    combine signatures for different transactions. The first ensures that LDK
    signs the peer’s proposed transaction, instead of reusing a cached signature
    from a different closing transaction just because the proposed fee matches.
    The second PR clears the pending signing state when a peer disconnects after
    an async signer was unavailable, preventing an old peer signature from being
    combined with a new local proposal after reconnection. Previously, in both
    cases, LDK could submit an invalid closing transaction for broadcast while
    treating the channel as closed, leaving behind funds that required recovery.

  • ● LND #11492 fixes onchain recovery of received atomic multipath payments
    (AMP) after a force close. Previously, LND could fail to find
    the preimage needed to claim an outstanding HTLC, even though
    it had already recorded the payment as settled. LND incorrectly checked for
    an invoice-level preimage instead of the preimage stored for the individual
    AMP HTLC. It now retrieves that HTLC’s preimage. The PR also prevents expiry
    checks intended for new payments from rejecting previously recorded
    spontaneous AMP and keysend HTLCs when they are
    processed again during recovery (see Newsletter #412 for
    earlier coverage of LND’s expiry checks).

  • ● LND #11479 fixes the handling of errors when publishing a transaction
    that opens multiple channels
    (see Newsletter
    #166
    ). Previously, an error during broadcast caused LND to
    abandon the pending channels and release their reserved wallet inputs, even
    if the transaction had reached the network and could still confirm. Now, LND
    keeps the pending channels’ state once publication is attempted, preserving
    the information needed to monitor the transaction and recover the channels.
    If the transaction can’t confirm, the retained pending channels require
    manual cleanup.

  • ● LND #11340 and #11374 extend LND’s experimental BOLT12
    offers
    support (see Newsletter #424) with
    offer creation and invoice request handling. The first PR adds a handler that
    validates requests against stored offers and replies with signed invoices.
    The second PR connects the handler to incoming onion messages and adds the CreateOffer RPC and the lncli createoffer command.
    However, the handler does not yet retain the invoice state needed to settle
    payments against the invoices it issues. The feature is only available in
    development builds and requires additional configuration.

  • ● LND #11480 fixes a crash when attempting to force close a channel
    restored from a static channel backup. Such a
    backup does not contain a usable local commitment transaction; recovery
    requires the counterparty to publish its commitment. Previously, the
    force-close path checked for local data loss but not the restored-channel
    status, allowing it to access a missing commitment transaction and panic. LND
    now rejects that local force-close attempt and handles the unavailable
    transaction safely, including when resuming an interrupted close after
    restart.

  • ● LND #11481 fixes how LND caches the starting block height for scans that
    check whether a transaction has confirmed. Previously, an attacker could
    propose a fake channel funding output with the txid of a revoked commitment
    transaction and a different output script. Since LND cached scan starting
    heights by txid alone, the fake funding request shared its cache entry with
    the request tracking the revoked commitment. The unmatched funding request
    could advance the starting height past the revoked transaction’s confirmation
    block, causing a later scan to miss it. This could delay LND’s detection of
    the revoked commitment and its penalty transaction. LND
    now stores separate starting heights for each txid and output script. The
    issue affects historical scans, including those used by Neutrino and by
    Bitcoin Core without a transaction index.

Want more?

For more discussion about the topics mentioned in this newsletter, join us for
the weekly Bitcoin Optech Recap on Riverside.fm at
17:30 UTC on November 17. The
discussion is also recorded and will be available from our podcasts
page.


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来源:Bitcoin Optech。本文按 MIT 许可转载;保留原文文字与链接,调整页面排版,未转载原图。标题如含主题导读,由新云社补充。 Original text and links retained; formatting adapted and images omitted. Any topic guide added to the title is editorial.

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