Press Enter to search · ESC to close

Crypto

Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #430

This week’s newsletter summarizes continued discussion about using TCP hole punching to make nodes behind home routers reachable and describes a draft BIP for s

This week’s newsletter summarizes continued discussion about using TCP hole
punching to make nodes behind home routers reachable and describes a draft
BIP for standardizing the spending policies that co-signers enforce when
emulating covenants. Also included are our regular sections summarizing
proposals and discussion about changing Bitcoin’s consensus rules, announcing
new releases and release candidates, and describing notable changes to
popular Bitcoin infrastructure software.

News

  • ● Continued discussion of TCP hole punching for home nodes: Following
    our May summary of 0xB10C’s Delving Bitcoin thread on
    using hole punching to let nodes behind home routers accept connections
    from each other, 0xB10C posted that work has
    resumed on a specification and an experimental Bitcoin Core implementation.
    Home nodes can usually only make outbound connections, and turning on
    NAT-PMP port mapping by default in Bitcoin Core 30.0 did not make many more
    of them reachable as hoped. Hole punching, in which two home nodes open
    connections to each other at the same moment so that each router lets the
    other’s traffic through, would be a best-effort supplement to port
    forwarding. More reachable honest nodes would make it harder for attackers,
    whose nodes are easier to reach, to fill a node’s outbound connection
    slots.

    0xB10C recapped the four designs discussed so far and
    proposed a new option that needs no coordinator: a
    node announces its punchable address and a temporary public key in a new
    addr v2 type, and each pair of nodes derives the same
    candidate list and punch timing from their shared secret and each new
    block. In response to Anthony Towns’s objection that an attacker could
    flood the scheme with real addresses, and after later finding that
    unreachable nodes receive such announcements far
    less reliably than listening nodes, he sketched a “message board”
    alternative in which listening nodes hold the verified addresses of home
    nodes looking for a peer.

    Towns questioned whether random inbound connections help home
    nodes at all and argued that hole punching makes it
    easier for an attacker to reach honest nodes directly while doing little to
    guarantee a connection to an honest one. He estimated that an attacker
    advertising about 10,000 addresses would be an early match for most honest
    nodes and suggested short-lived connections to random peers as a lower-risk
    alternative. Jonathan Harvey-Buschel cited data showing honest nodes are
    less reachable than attacker-controlled ones and favored coordinating
    through a node’s own Tor service. Towns later
    asked whether recent TCP and protocol vulnerabilities
    make not accepting inbound connections the safer default for home users.
    Discussion is ongoing.

  • ● BIP draft for standardized co-signer spending policies: Luke Carriere
    posted to Delving Bitcoin about his proposal for
    standardizing the spending policies enforced by co-signers when emulating
    covenants. Several recent designs, including Johan
    Halseth’s blinded co-signers and chain code
    delegation
    , each define their own policy, so a wallet
    built for one cannot use a co-signer or oracle built for another. Carriere
    is not requesting a BIP number for the draft and
    asked whether this is the right layer to standardize.

    The draft follows several design principles:

    • Anything that can be enforced by Bitcoin script must be enforced there,
      with co-signer policies only defining what script cannot.

    • At least one spending path that needs no co-signer must always be
      available.

    • How a co-signer verifies a spend, and what backs its honesty, are
      pluggable profiles chosen per policy.

    • Co-signers must accept oracle attestations in the
      DLC format so that already-available oracles can be reused
      with no modifications.

    A policy has five parts. The output defines the
    taproot descriptor that holds the funds, the co-signer
    group tells which co-signers take part and how many must sign, templates
    list the transactions the co-signers may sign with their exact outputs,
    conditions state what must be true before each template can be signed, and
    profiles name the verification mode, evidence formats, and any
    accountability scheme. Some points
    remain open, such as whether to use JSON or TLV for serialization, whether
    blinded verification should be specified now or wait for more implementation
    experience, whether to specify statement attestation format in the proposal
    or in the DLC specifications, and whether the fallback path must be timelocked.

    In the discussion that followed, PREDGE pointed out that one of the evidence
    profiles, called statement-v0, lacks a finality flag, meaning that a co-signer
    could act on a provisional attestation later corrected. Moreover, tehiyadu stated
    that the policy hash should commit to the exact verifier semantics to prevent
    different implementations from accepting the same bytes while enforcing different
    conditions. Carriere agreed with both points and said he would add a finality
    flag and pin down the verifier rules.

Changing consensus

A monthly section summarizing proposals and discussion about changing
Bitcoin’s consensus rules.

  • ● Continued discussion of BIP54: Antoine Riard posted to
    the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list about his perspective on the state of the
    consensus cleanup soft fork (BIP54).
    Forbidding transactions whose witness-stripped size is exactly 64 bytes is
    still the most contested rule. A Bitcoin Core implementation is under review
    and testing and is the reference implementation linked from the BIP
    (Bitcoin Core #35793). The PR enables the new rules on regtest with no
    mainnet activation. He also pointed to interoperability work in btcd
    (btcd #2537) and said he knows of no libbitcoin implementation. In his
    view what remains is more review and testing, documentation so wallets know
    about the proposed limit of 2,500 signature operations in pre-segwit script
    and about the 64-byte rule, and, only later, activation logic. Speaking only
    for himself, he thought it could be realistic to start considering
    activation in the second half of 2027 if the community agrees by then.

    Pieter Wuille updated his Delving Bitcoin thread
    on how the two BIP54 timestamp rules bound chain length (see Newsletter
    #425
    ). The top post now includes the accurate formula for
    the lower bound on work, and both that formula and the decimal approximation
    are now proven in the linked Lean code.

    Riard followed up on an objection raised during the
    design of BIP54: that fixing the time warp bug would make
    a consensus change in the style of Mark Friedenbach’s
    forward blocks
    impossible for the rest of Bitcoin’s future history. Because the fix
    constrains timestamp manipulation rather than removing it, a much more
    limited forward blocks proposal could still be implemented. He estimated
    that the 7,200-second window still allowed by the fix could lower difficulty
    by roughly 0.60% per retarget period, and raise the block rate by about as
    much, far short of the capacity increase of the original
    proposal. Riard also argued the idea is unsound even with the old rules:
    validators would process transactions once on the forward chain and again
    when they are synchronized onto the compatibility chain, for the same fees
    unless users paid twice, and nodes that had not upgraded would still have to
    download the extra data. Riard will propose a short BIP54 footnote making
    that case, and ask Friedenbach for counter-arguments.

  • ● Opt-in replay protection prototype: Sjors Provoost
    followed up on the Delving Bitcoin thread about opt-in
    replay protection for a chain split (see Newsletter #420)
    with a prototype that uses a new witness version. An annex
    whose payload starts with the byte 0x01 names a block by a 4-byte height,
    and every signature on that input commits to the block’s hash on the desired
    chain. The hash itself is not present in the transaction. He put the extra
    cost at 1.75 vbytes. The named block must be at least 100 blocks old, the
    same horizon as coinbase maturity. He said that if hashrate were split
    evenly, the wait before coins could be split would be two days at worst,
    because the rule only has to hold on one side. He suggested shipping the
    witness version together with another proposal that needs one, such as
    CISA (BIP460), BIP360, or a P2TRv2-style
    output with a keypath that can later be disabled.

    Anthony Towns replied that a new witness version is
    unnecessary, and that a new public-key encoding for a taproot signature
    check, in the style of BIP118, would be enough. Provoost
    answered that he had considered that encoding
    and thought it a hack, and that as he understood it, it would not work for
    a keypath spend.

    Moonsettler questioned whether requiring 100 blocks is
    desirable in the split where the feature would matter most, and suggested
    keeping that delay as a policy rule that could be relaxed. Provoost
    replied that after coins move on the faster
    side and gather confirmations, the slower side no longer needs the
    protection. Provoost also wrote that he expects the rule to be deployed
    before a contentious hard fork, so both sides inherit it, and that neither
    side can easily drop it: the block hash is only in the signature message, so
    removing the rule means changing transaction serialization to carry the hash.

  • ● QSAVE for unmigrated coins: James Tagg posted to the
    Bitcoin-Dev mailing list five draft BIPs for QSAVE (Quantum
    Secure Asset Verification and Escrow), a
    post-quantum transition that does not burn
    coins. He described these as an alternative to BIP361 and to
    Hourglass. From an enforcement height, which could be
    activated as a soft fork at any time, any input that is not on a registry of
    known post-quantum types would be treated as unmigrated, including
    unknown and future script types. An unmigrated input would still need
    to satisfy its locking script, and also a second factor: either a
    zero-knowledge proof that one seed derives both the spent script and a
    post-quantum key, or a post-quantum binding committed before a cutoff. If
    any unmigrated input in a transaction lacks that second factor, every
    spendable output must be a recovery output. In QSAVE, there is no sunset, so
    a missing second factor does not destroy the coin. An onchain proof can
    always spend it directly, with no third party. Otherwise he described an
    offchain lost-property process, whose legal and economic treatment he
    placed outside consensus, in which a set of decentralized custodians would
    hold the recovery outputs, with a backup custodian and a veto controller,
    and the funds could earn a conservative 0.5% return directed to charity. The
    drafts also specify pre-cutoff watermarks, an optional ML-DSA-87 key he
    called QD5, and a zk-STARK spend leaf for BIP360 (P2MR)
    outputs.

  • ● Proof-of-decay for unmigrated outputs: bitKingAE
    posted to Delving Bitcoin a sketch for shrinking
    post-quantum-exposed outputs, such as early P2PK
    coins, that are not moved within a grace period. After the grace period
    expires, the output’s value would fall on a schedule with block height.
    The lost satoshis would be burned or paid out as mining rewards rather than
    the coins being frozen or left for whoever can produce a signature. The
    post’s example was a small percentage of the balance every 50,000 blocks.
    Vinicius Cestari replied with three objections: a
    quantum attacker can wait until the grace period ends and sweep exposed
    outputs before the decay has done much; a sudden improvement in quantum
    attacks can drain them even earlier; and the schedule reduces the balance of
    a passive owner, including one whose keys were already stolen.

  • ● BIP300 bundle censorship: Ori Newman argued on the
    Bitcoin-Dev mailing list that a miner with 26% of hashrate can censor a
    valid withdrawal bundle in the drivechains proposal
    (BIP300) indefinitely. He wrote that if the 26% miner sends an ALARM in
    every block it mines, each of those blocks lowers the score of every
    pending bundle by 1. If the other 74% of hashrate upvotes a bundle in every
    block, its expected score would be 12,624 at the end of the 26,300-block
    window, short of the 13,150 required. He suggested forbidding ALARM and any
    other downvote, which would restore an honest majority assumption: a bundle
    supported by 51% of hashrate would almost certainly pass, and one supported
    by 49% would almost certainly fail. If the current rule is intentional, he
    asked that the BIP instead state a 75% honest majority assumption. He called
    that a strong departure from Bitcoin’s security model, and said one argument
    for it is that stealing funds would be harder for an attacker with less than
    75% of hashrate.

Releases and release candidates

New releases and release candidates for popular Bitcoin infrastructure
projects. Please consider upgrading to new releases or helping to test
release candidates.

  • ● LND v0.21.6-beta and v0.20.7-beta are security
    releases for the 0.21 and 0.20 branches of this popular LN node
    implementation. Both include the mitigation for the Linux kernel
    vulnerability CVE-2026-98432 described under LND #11456 below. Linux
    operators should upgrade, disable MPTCP on the host to protect other
    services, and install a patched kernel, since the LND
    mitigation does not fix the underlying vulnerability.

  • ● Core Lightning 26.06.10 is a security release of this popular LN node
    implementation. It fixes vulnerabilities in dual funding, splicing, onchain HTLC resolution,
    access controls, and other components. Source code for the security fixes is
    available, while associated tests are temporarily withheld to give users more
    time to upgrade. The project strongly recommends upgrading.

  • ● BTCPay Server 2.4.7 is a security release of this self-hosted payment
    processor. It fixes 85 security findings reported by Anthropic’s
    OSS Scanner program, including issues affecting
    payout limits, access to other stores’ data, authentication, and resource
    exhaustion. It also fixes payment-accounting and reliability issues. Updating
    is strongly recommended, especially for servers shared by multiple merchants.

Notable code and documentation changes

Notable recent changes in Bitcoin Core, Core
Lightning
, Eclair, LDK,
LND, libsecp256k1, Hardware Wallet
Interface (HWI)
, Rust Bitcoin, BTCPay
Server
, BDK, Bitcoin Improvement
Proposals (BIPs)
, Lightning BOLTs,
Lightning BLIPs, Bitcoin Inquisition, and BINANAs.

  • ● Bitcoin Core #36539 restores the PSBTv0 format for unsigned transactions
    and fee bumps exported from the GUI. Bitcoin Core 32.1 exported these
    PSBTs using version 2, preventing users from signing them with
    tools that only support version 0. The separate external-signer workflow
    configured with -signer (see Newsletter #138) continues
    to use PSBTv2, so those users need an external signer that supports it,
    such as HWI 2.1.0 or later.

  • ● Bitcoin Core #35714 fixes a bug where the node could update its block
    index and UTXO database after failing to flush block or undo data to disk.
    Although the failure signaled the node to shut down, the code handling these
    writes could still update the databases before the node stopped. If these
    updates succeeded, the databases could record a state for which the
    supporting block or undo data had not yet been safely saved. This could leave
    the node’s local state inconsistent and complicate recovery. The code now
    skips those database writes during the failing flush attempt. This
    complements earlier flush ordering protections for optional indexes covered
    in Newsletter #414.

  • ● Bitcoin Core #35492 fixes a bug where bitcoin-wallet dump (see
    Newsletter #130) could report success after writing an
    incomplete wallet export. Previously, the command checked if it could open
    the destination file but did not detect subsequent write failures, such as
    running out of disk space. Consequently, users could mistakenly believe that
    the export was complete, only to discover missing data when trying to restore
    the wallet. Now, the command verifies the writing, flushing, and closing of
    the file. It reports failures and removes incomplete dump files.

  • ● BIPs #2205, #2210, and #2212 add three draft
    specifications for cross-input signature aggregation.
    BIP458 specifies non-interactive half aggregation, combining n existing
    BIP340 signatures into 32 × (n + 1) bytes instead of 64 × n bytes.
    BIP459 specifies DahLIAS, an interactive protocol that produces a single
    64-byte aggregate signature for multiple keys and messages. BIP460
    proposes using these schemes for keypath spends of new witness-version-2
    outputs, while retaining individual signatures for scriptpath spends and
    allowing keypath inputs to opt out. Since the proposal was covered in
    Newsletter #417, opted-out inputs have been changed to use
    ordinary BIP341 signatures without a special marker, allowing wallets to
    adopt the new output type while reusing their existing signing logic. This
    would reduce transaction weight and fees for transactions with multiple
    participating inputs, including coinjoins and
    payjoins. Deploying the proposed transaction aggregation
    would require a soft fork. BIP460 leaves the activation mechanism and
    parameters unspecified.

  • ● Core Lightning #9419 adds an optional failure_reason field to the
    listforwards RPC and forward_event notifications for locally failed
    forwarding attempts. Previously, several distinct problems shared the same
    protocol failure code, which made it difficult for operators to determine why
    forwarding failed. The new field distinguishes between causes such as
    insufficient outgoing liquidity, an offline outgoing peer, and limits on the
    number or total value of pending HTLCs.

  • ● Core Lightning #9592 updates xpay (see Newsletter #330)
    to avoid a forwarding node for the remainder of a payment after it twice
    returns unknown_next_peer. Previously, each failure excluded only the
    reported channel, so successive attempts could keep selecting other channels
    through the same node until the payment’s retry time expired. Now, after the
    second failure from the same node, xpay excludes it through the payment’s
    private askrene routing layer. This heuristic can exclude usable channels,
    but limits repeated attempts through the same node.

  • ● LDK #5089 updates fee bumping during force closes of channels with
    anchor outputs. If LDK cannot obtain the necessary
    funds for a CPFP child transaction that spends an anchor
    output, it now broadcasts the commitment transaction alone. Previously, this
    failure could leave both transactions unbroadcast, delaying recovery of
    channel funds. The commitment already includes a fee, which may still be
    sufficient for confirmation if the fee estimate was conservative or network
    demand falls. However, this fallback excludes zero-fee commitment
    transactions
    , which require a fee-paying child
    transaction for relay. The issue was reported by Project Loupe.

  • ● LND #11456 disables Multipath TCP (MPTCP) listeners by default to
    mitigate CVE-2026-98432, a Linux kernel vulnerability for
    which remote code execution was demonstrated using MPTCP. Go 1.24 and later
    enable these listeners by default on supported Linux systems, which could
    expose LND operators even if they don’t explicitly configure MPTCP. The
    change sets multipathtcp=0 in LND’s Go defaults. This blocks the
    demonstrated exploit path through LND’s listeners, but does not fix the
    underlying kernel bug. Affected systems still require a patched kernel.
    Operators using existing binaries can apply the same mitigation by restarting
    LND with the environment variable GODEBUG=multipathtcp=0.

  • ● LND #11357 tightens BOLT11 invoice validation following BOLTs
    #1357
    (see Newsletter #428). Instead of using the first
    and ignoring the rest, it now rejects duplicate payment secret fields,
    preventing ambiguity between parsers that select different occurrences. This
    builds on the earlier rejection of duplicate payment hashes (see Newsletter
    #425
    ). Tests added by the specification update also revealed
    that existing requirements were not being enforced. The decoder now rejects
    incorrect lengths when parsing the payment hash, description hash,
    payment secret, and
    receiver public key, instead of treating those fields as absent. Previously,
    an incorrectly sized receiver public key field could cause LND to fall back
    to recovering the key from the signature. For invoices containing an explicit
    receiver public key, a low-S ECDSA signature is also required. However, this
    restriction does not apply when the public key is recovered from the
    signature (see Newsletter #381).

  • ● LND #11413 speeds up the startup cleanup of stored outgoing payment
    results on nodes using SQLite or PostgreSQL. During normal operation, the
    node accumulates a result for each resolved, locally initiated HTLC attempt. At startup, it removes results that are no longer needed.
    Previously, reading and deleting entries individually required repeated
    database round trips, which could make cleanup take hours on a busy node
    using remote PostgreSQL. Now, cleanup batches database operations while
    preserving the results needed to resume pending payments.

  • ● LND #11151 adds checks for excessive commitment feerates and inadequate
    initial balances when accepting incoming channels. LND now rejects a proposed
    feerate above the greater of ten times its three-block estimate and 100 sat/vbyte. It also enforces BOLT2’s initial-reserve
    rule and separately rejects channels where neither party’s initial balance
    exceeds the reserve that party must maintain. Although the initiator pays the
    commitment fee, an excessive fee can consume their usable balance, wasting
    the receiver’s pending-channel capacity during opening and leaving behind an
    unusable channel once the funding transaction is confirmed. This complements
    the minimum feerate checks covered in Newsletter #429.

  • ● Rust Bitcoin #7067 extends the taproot signature hash
    (sighash) helpers to accept an optional annex and, for
    scriptpath spends, the opcode position of the last OP_CODESEPARATOR executed before the signature check. Both affect the
    message that a signature commits to. Previously, these convenience functions
    assumed no annex and no executed OP_CODESEPARATOR, so callers handling such
    spends had to use the more general sighash function to avoid producing an
    incorrect digest. The helpers now accept these values directly, although
    callers must still determine the separator position. Callers handling spends
    without an annex or an executed OP_CODESEPARATOR can pass None for the
    new arguments to retain the previous behavior. See Newsletter #427 for related sighash API changes for legacy and segwit v0
    spends.


转载说明 / Republication notice

来源:Bitcoin Optech。本文按 MIT 许可转载;保留原文文字与链接,调整页面排版,未转载原图。标题如含主题导读,由新云社补充。 Original text and links retained; formatting adapted and images omitted. Any topic guide added to the title is editorial.

来源许可说明 · MIT License

The MIT License (MIT)

Copyright (c) 2018 Bitcoin Optech contributors

Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:

The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
copies or substantial portions of the Software.

THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
SOFTWARE.
Share
Risk notice News, market information, data and other content published by 新云社 are for information and general reference only, and do not constitute investment, legal, tax or other professional advice.

Related Reading

Latest News

新云社 share card
Long-press image above → Save to Photos / Share
Pitch us Feedback