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Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #432

This week’s newsletter summarizes an analysis of decentralized mining pool payouts, describes the disclosure of a fixed denial-of-service vulnerability in Eclai

This week’s newsletter summarizes an analysis of decentralized mining pool
payouts, describes the disclosure of a fixed denial-of-service vulnerability
in Eclair, and links to continued discussion about whether stale tip relay
should include block data. Also included are our regular sections describing
recent changes to services and client software, announcing new releases and
release candidates, and describing notable changes to popular Bitcoin
infrastructure software.

News

  • ● Framework for decentralized mining pool payouts: Developer 7d5x9
    posted to Delving Bitcoin an analysis of how decentralized
    mining pools can pay miners directly from coinbase
    transactions, which the post calls decentralized coinbase payout protocols
    (DCPPs). Giving every miner its own output does not scale because mining
    firmware limits coinbase transaction size and each output displaces
    fee-paying transactions. The post argues that when a pool has more miners
    than outputs, any rule ranking miners by work allows a rich list attack,
    where a large miner splits its hashrate across identities that each still
    outrank the smallest miners, pushing them out of the coinbase transaction.

    According to 7d5x9, earlier designs only move this problem. Braidpool shifts
    it from who receives an output to who controls the pool’s threshold key (see
    Newsletter #340). For a single coinbase output paying a
    joinpool with unilateral exits, the obstacle is that
    miners vary the coinbase transaction for extra nonce space, so its txid is
    unknown and exit transactions cannot be signed until a block is found. 7d5x9
    believes this leaves the output controlled by a single key or threshold of
    keys until a soft fork enables rebindable signatures, such as those proposed
    in BIP448 (see Newsletter #397). In sketches based on
    Spark-style statechains and on Ark, an
    attacker keeping one small claim per subtree can block cheap cooperative
    settlement, raising miners’ costs, though the post considers this less
    severe for Ark.

    The post concludes that a joinpool does not decide which outputs enter the
    coinbase transaction. It sees two options for that: a value-weighted random
    draw (an idea credited to Matt Corallo) or outputs reserved for designated
    operators.

    LearnBitcoin.com, who ran a public P2Pool node, examined 2,545
    P2Pool coinbase transactions and argued that growth alone, without any
    attacker, squeezed out small miners because P2Pool raised the share
    difficulty of miners expected to earn under 0.001 BTC per block. For its
    successor P2Poolv2, jungly suggested a limit of 16 outputs
    given current firmware. Steven Roose replied that he could not
    think of a scheme worth exploring without covenants,
    which would let a coinbase output deterministically commit to an Ark
    transaction tree that pays every miner who uses the same Ark server.

  • ● Disclosure of a DoS vulnerability in Eclair: rorp posted
    to Delving Bitcoin the responsible disclosure of a memory-exhaustion denial-of-service (DoS)
    vulnerability affecting Eclair version 0.14.0 and fixed in July
    2026 in release 0.14.1. Any peer able to connect to a vulnerable node could crash
    it, even without having a channel with it. The bug gave an attacker no
    direct access to funds, but repeatedly crashing a node could put its channel
    funds at risk. Users still running 0.14.0 should upgrade.

    The attack vector leveraged a missing size check in Eclair. According to BOLT2,
    messages can be sent in batches to be treated as a single logical update through the
    start_batch message, which among other fields carries the batch_size. According
    to the specifications, the size must be at most 20 and strictly greater than 1.
    While Eclair checked for the upper bound, it did not enforce the lower one.

    An attacker would have been able to use this vulnerability by sending a start_batch
    message with batch_size = 0, followed by commitment_signed messages, which are
    sent in batches during splicing. Since the code stopped adding
    messages to its internal batch only once the number of received messages reached the
    batch_size (which was 0, thus always lower than the number of messages received),
    the list never stopped growing, leading to memory exhaustion.
    The vulnerability was fixed by having the code check the lower bound, too, as
    specified in BOLT2.

  • ● Continued discussion of stale tip relay: Antoine Poinsot
    replied to the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list thread about
    BIP332 stale tip relay (see Newsletters #417 and
    #423) to suggest that nodes initially relay only the
    headers of stale blocks. Poinsot argued that headers are enough to make stale
    blocks observable. Relaying the block data as well lets nodes reorganize
    faster to a chain built on a stale block, which increases the expected
    revenue of a miner that briefly keeps mining on its own block after losing a
    block race. Poinsot considered that effect most likely
    small but not worth working out rigorously.

    Anthony Towns replied that any miner who would benefit can
    cheaply implement stale block relay itself. Towns
    estimated that a pool with 20% of network hashrate already
    gains about 16.1 BTC per year by mining on its own block instead of a
    competing block it saw first at the same height, and that cutting the relay
    delay of the resulting one-block reorg from five seconds to one would raise
    that to 16.36 BTC. Towns also argued that stale headers can raise concerns,
    such as possible selfish mining, but only the block
    data can settle them. Poinsot agreed that the estimate
    appears to cover the effect on honest mining incentives and, while still
    seeing most of the value in headers, did not want to block relaying full
    blocks.

Changes to services and client software

In this monthly feature, we highlight interesting updates to Bitcoin
wallets and services.

  • ● Liana v16.0 released: Liana v16.0 writes its encrypted
    descriptor backups in the BIP138 format (see
    Newsletter #424) and makes taproot the
    default for new wallets.

  • ● COLDCARD firmware adds codex32 backups: Coinkite
    announced COLDCARD firmware versions 5.6.3 and 1.5.3Q,
    which add support for generating and importing codex32
    secrets and for splitting the device’s wallet into two to nine Shamir shares
    for later recovery. The releases also add support for per-input height and
    time locktimes in PSBTv2 transactions.

  • ● Wavelength released on mainnet: Lightning Labs
    announced that Wavelength, its Ark-like
    payments toolkit (see Newsletter #415), is available
    on mainnet as an alpha with accounts limited to 300,000 sats.

  • ● Bull Bitcoin makes payjoin the default for exchange orders: Bull Bitcoin
    announced that onchain purchases and sales made on its
    exchange through the Bull Bitcoin Mobile wallet now use
    payjoin by default (see Newsletter #338).
    Version 6.14.0 of the wallet also adds experimental support
    for sending and receiving silent payments.

  • ● Breez SDK adds silent payment sending: Version 0.28.0 of
    the Spark-based Breez SDK adds support for sending to
    silent payment addresses.

  • ● Silent payments scanner for Electrum plugin: Ali Sherief
    announced spscand, a watch-only
    silent payments scanner that works with the
    Electrum sending plugin covered in Newsletter #419.
    It can scan for payments using the user’s own Bitcoin Core node, a BlindBit
    server, or a BlindBit server combined with
    compact block filters from P2P peers.

  • ● Stratum v2 releases and pool adoption: The
    Stratum v2 reference implementation released
    sv2-apps v0.9.0, which adds support for Bitcoin Core 32.x, including
    submitting found blocks over its IPC interface, and hardens its Job
    Declarator Client (see Newsletter #384 for previous
    coverage). Separately, MARA Foundation announced that MARA mined
    its first block using Stratum v2, and Foundry announced that
    it has begun testing Stratum v2 on its pool.

  • ● Coinswap renamed to OpenSwap: OpenSwap v0.2.3 is the first release
    under the new name of the coinswap protocol implementation
    formerly called Coinswap (see Newsletter #415). It adds
    an Electrum server backend option, swaps that pay a third-party address,
    and, when built with Lightning support, swaps between onchain funds and LN
    through LDK Server (see Newsletter #406).

Releases and release candidates

New releases and release candidates for popular Bitcoin infrastructure
projects. Please consider upgrading to new releases or helping to test
release candidates.

  • ● Core Lightning 26.12rc1 is a release candidate for the next major version
    of this popular LN node implementation. It will be the first major release
    since 26.06 and covers two release cycles. It adds a tool for recovering
    HTLC outputs after channel-state loss (see Core Lightning #9730
    below), improves payment pathfinding (see Newsletters #418 and #430), and adds experimental support for a
    new cooperative close protocol (see Newsletter #413).
    The release notes also announce that xpay will replace pay in 27.03.

Notable code and documentation changes

Notable recent changes in Bitcoin Core, Core
Lightning
, Eclair, LDK,
LND, libsecp256k1, Hardware Wallet
Interface (HWI)
, Rust Bitcoin, BTCPay
Server
, BDK, Bitcoin Improvement
Proposals (BIPs)
, Lightning BOLTs,
Lightning BLIPs, Bitcoin Inquisition, and BINANAs.

  • ● Bitcoin Core #36757 fixes a privacy leak in address discovery over Tor
    and I2P
    . Previously, when a node connected
    outbound to a malicious Tor or I2P peer, that peer could claim to see the
    node at an arbitrary routable IP address in its version message. Bitcoin
    Core could then advertise that address back to the peer, along with its own
    clearnet listening port. A distinctive port could then help correlate the
    connection with a clearnet node that was observed using the same port (see
    Newsletter #52 for an earlier Tor listening-port fix). Bitcoin
    Core now ignores the address that Tor and I2P peers report seeing the
    node at.

  • ● BIPs #2356 replaces the placeholder genesis parameters in BIP95 with
    those of the mined testnet5 genesis block and marks the BIP
    as Deployed. The genesis coinbase includes the date 2026-11-14 and the hash
    of mainnet block 975,744. Committing to that hash ensures that the testnet5
    genesis block could only be mined after mainnet reached that height (see
    Newsletter #431).

  • ● Core Lightning #9730 adds the lightning-hsmtool recoverhtlc command to
    manually recover HTLC outputs after local channel-state loss.
    Once the peer publishes its latest commitment transaction, the recovering
    node can already reclaim its main output using a static channel
    backup
    (see Newsletter #421). Given the local hsm_secret, channel and HTLC details, and the
    peer’s per-commitment point, the new command identifies matching HTLC
    outputs. The tool constructs signed transactions to reclaim outgoing HTLCs
    after a timeout or to claim incoming HTLCs with known preimages. However, the
    operator must manually review and broadcast the transactions. A cooperative
    CLN peer can export the public point using the
    dumpcommitments --point-only command without revealing secrets.

  • ● LDK #5561 fixes a potential loss of forwarded funds when a peer sends
    revoke_and_ack before LDK sends the corresponding commitment_signed
    message. Previously, LDK could accept this premature acknowledgment and
    advance its internal commitment number. Consequently, it could sign a
    commitment that differed from the one recorded by its onchain monitor. If the
    peer published that commitment, LDK might fail to claim the incoming HTLC,
    even after paying the outgoing HTLC, despite knowing its preimage. LDK now
    rejects the premature acknowledgment and force closes the channel. The fix
    was released in LDK 0.2.8 (see Newsletter #431). Newsletter
    #426
    described an earlier bug that left a signed commitment
    unmonitored during reconnection.

  • ● LDK #5562 and #5545 fix channel ID collisions that a
    malicious peer could create between its channels and an LDK node. In the
    first, the peer could reuse a force-closed channel’s known ID as a new
    channel’s temporary ID. This could prevent LDK from recording a forwarded
    payment’s preimage in the closed channel’s monitor, leaving the incoming
    HTLC unclaimed after the outgoing HTLC had been paid. In the
    second, the peer could calculate a channel’s future final ID from its funding
    transaction and submit another opening request with that temporary ID. If the
    original channel adopted its final ID before the application accepted the new
    request, acceptance could overwrite its funded state. LDK now rejects
    conflicting IDs and rechecks them at acceptance. Both fixes were also
    released in LDK 0.2.8. See Newsletter #427 for related
    channel ID collisions that could cause a DoS in Eclair.

  • ● LDK #5557 fixes a vulnerability that allowed malicious peers to disrupt
    transaction monitoring on nodes using an Electrum backend. The peer could
    propose a channel whose claimed funding output reused an already-watched
    outpoint, but with a different locking script. Registering that proposal
    could overwrite the legitimate watch’s stored script, even if LDK
    subsequently rejected the channel. LDK would then query Electrum for
    transactions associated with the bogus script and might miss a transaction
    spending the real output, preventing a timely response to a channel closure.
    LDK now retains every distinct script registered for an outpoint, so a bogus
    registration cannot suppress the legitimate watch. This fix was also released
    in LDK 0.2.8.

  • ● LDK #5558 and #5482 fix two ways payments could exceed their
    fee budget. The first PR addresses the handling of an omitted fee-limit
    setting for async payments using static
    BOLT12 invoices (see Newsletter #321). LDK
    now applies its default cap of 1% of the payment amount plus 50 sat when the
    application omits the setting. Previously, omitting it removed the limit
    entirely, allowing a malicious receiver to supply a blinded path with excessive fees. This fix was also released in LDK 0.2.8. The
    second PR addresses retries when a route adds value to meet an HTLC minimum.
    LDK treated the extra value as part of the requested payment and restored the
    failed path’s fee budget on retry, allowing the total spend to exceed its
    limit. LDK now retries only the remaining amount owed and counts any excess
    against the remaining fee budget.

  • ● LND #11555 changes how LND reports non-AMP invoices as
    settled. Although applications could already monitor when the settlement of
    individual HTLCs was locked in offchain (see Newsletter
    #224
    ), LND could mark an invoice as settled as soon as the
    preimage was released. The invoice now enters the PENDING_SETTLE state on
    preimage release. Once every HTLC in the payment has a final offchain or
    onchain outcome, LND marks the invoice as SETTLED if all parts were
    collected or CANCELED if any failed. A canceled invoice can still have
    collected some parts, which are not refunded, so applications should credit
    only the amounts from finalized, successful HTLCs. An invoice’s
    preimage_released flag records whether LND has committed to releasing the
    preimage. AMP payment sets still settle at preimage release.

  • ● LND #11551 fixes expiry validation when completing multipath
    payments
    and AMP payments.
    Previously, LND checked each HTLC when it arrived. If more blocks were mined
    while the receiver waited for the remaining parts, LND could release
    preimages even though an earlier HTLC no longer had the required expiry
    margin
    for onchain collection. Now, LND rechecks
    every part against the current block height when the final part arrives. If a
    previously accepted part is now too close to expiry, LND fails that set and
    leaves the invoice open for another attempt (see Newsletter #424 for earlier work on canceling individual AMP sets).

  • ● LND #11472 and #10842 fix cases where temporary backend
    errors or one problematic input could block otherwise valid sweeps. The first
    keeps inputs available for retry after temporary or unclassified errors
    during mempool acceptance checks (see Newsletter #373). It
    was released in LND 0.21.8-beta and 0.20.8-beta (see Newsletter
    #431
    ). The second uses diagnostic transactions that are never
    broadcast to test subsets of a rejected batch. If an invalid or conflicting
    input can be identified, LND excludes it from the next attempt and retries
    the remaining inputs.

  • ● LND #11542 fixes recovery of forwarded HTLCs after channel
    reconnections. When replaying stored forwarding batches, LND could filter out
    acknowledged HTLCs and then use the remaining entries’ new positions to look
    up metadata indexed by their original positions. This could cause unresolved
    HTLCs to be skipped or misassociated. Additionally, if a channel’s HTLC
    handler stopped after LND recorded the batch but before handing off an HTLC,
    an incomplete record could be left behind, causing retries to be discarded as
    duplicates. LND now preserves the original batch indexes and removes
    incomplete records after a failed handoff, allowing unresolved HTLCs to be
    retried. The fix was released in LND 0.21.8-beta and 0.20.8-beta (see
    Newsletter #431).

Want more?

For more discussion about the topics mentioned in this newsletter, join us for
the weekly Bitcoin Optech Recap on Riverside.fm at
17:30 UTC on November 24. The
discussion is also recorded and will be available from our podcasts
page.


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来源:Bitcoin Optech。本文按 MIT 许可转载;保留原文文字与链接,调整页面排版,未转载原图。标题如含主题导读,由新云社补充。 Original text and links retained; formatting adapted and images omitted. Any topic guide added to the title is editorial.

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